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Abstract 
In 2018, Jair Bolsonaro, a former captain and congressman known for 
his racist, sexist, and homophobic remarks, was elected president of 
Brazil. His election shocked political analysts, representing the most 
significant setback for Brazilian democracy since the end of military 
rule in the 1980s. The present work analyses the social actors and 
political processes behind Bolsonaro’s rise to power, focusing on the 
role of anti-gender politics in the recent authoritarian turn in Brazil. 
Borrowing insights from social movement literature, the article 
explores the dynamics of anti-gender protest events, their main social 
and political actors, and repertoires of actions and demands. It also 
reviews the recent debate on the crisis of democracy and the rise of 
extreme right-wing movements and parties, focusing on the centrality 
of opposition to gender equality and LGBTQI+ rights in the rhetoric 
and action of conservative and far-right groups. 
 
Resumo 
Em 2018, Jair Bolsonaro, ex-capitão e deputado conhecido por seus 
comentários racistas, sexistas e homofóbicos, foi eleito presidente do 
Brasil. Sua eleição chocou analistas políticos, representando o maior 
retrocesso na democracia brasileira desde o fim do regime militar nos 
anos 80. O presente trabalho analisa os atores sociais e os processos 
políticos que viabilizaram a ascensão de Bolsonaro ao poder, 
concentrando-se no papel das políticas anti-gênero na recente virada 
autoritária no Brasil. Inspirado em alguns insights da literatura sobre 
movimentos sociais, o trabalho explora a dinâmica dos eventos de 
protesto anti-gênero, seus principais atores sociais e políticos, 
repertórios de ações e demandas. Também analisa o recente debate 
sobre a crise da democracia e o avanço de movimentos e partidos de 
extrema direita, centrando-se na centralidade da oposição à igualdade 
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In October 2018, Jair Bolsonaro, a former captain and congressman known for his 
racist, sexist, and homophobic remarks, was elected president of Brazil. His election shocked 
political analysts across the world. Until then, Brazil had been considered a case of 
successful democratic consolidation.  For 30 years, the country experienced peaceful 
rotation of power between centre-right and centre-left political forces and a steady, although 
modest, reduction of social inequalities. As a world-known publication stated in 2009, Brazil 
was “taking off”(The Economist, 2009) and on a trajectory of economic prosperity and social 
justice. However, this scenario has started to change dangerously in recent years. In June 
2013, Brazil was shaken by multitudinous demonstrations all over the country. The so-called 
“June Journeys” changed Brazilian political landscape dramatically, leading to a long period 
of political instability.  
Bolsonaro’s campaign was based on a strong anti-politics rhetoric, articulating a 
widespread anti-Worker’s Party sentiment (antipetismo), a rejection of corrupt political elites, 
and opposition to many of the “new left agendas”, particularly blacks, women, LGBTQI+ 
and indigenous people’s rights, and environmentalism. The opposition to gender equality 
and sexual diversity was crucial to this articulation, particularly in engaging evangelical and 
catholic constituencies in Bolsonaro’s campaign. It largely used images and symbols that 
portrayed feminists and LGBTQI+ activists as morally corrupt, engaged in a war against 
God, the family, and the nation.  
 The present work aims to analyse the social actors and the political processes behind 
the recent authoritarian turn in Brazilian politics represented by Bolsonaro’s rise to power. 
It focuses on the role of anti-gender politics (Kunhar and Paternotte, 2017) in this 
authoritarian turn, particularly the recent engagement of extreme-right groups and 
individuals that opposed the agenda of sexual and reproductive rights.  
Bolsonaro’s election can be considered part of a recent rise of the extreme-right to 
power in different parts of the world. Although the rise of the extreme-right depends 
heavily on national contexts, one can identify certain common and transnational trends, 
such as the negative effects of the 2008 economic crisis which led to the current crisis of 
representative democracy. This crisis took place at a moment of increasing public visibility 
of the so-called sexual minorities across a number of countries (including Brazil), 
demanding (with different levels of success) the recognition of their identities and rights. 
The public visibility of sexual minorities has largely been used by extreme-right populist 
leaders, such as Bolsonaro, as the symbol of a perceived threat to certain social groups, 
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helping to galvanize the articulation of different (and sometimes antagonistic) demands 
around an authoritarian extreme-right agenda.  
Borrowing insights from the literature on social movements, particularly from 
studies focusing on right-wing social movements, the present work explores the dynamics 
of anti-gender politics in Brazil, highlighting key social and political actors, their collective 
repertoires of action, their demands, and their objectives.  To do so, the work analyses 
newspaper articles relating to anti-gender politics published between 2011 and 2018, in the 
Folha de S. Paulo, Brazil’s most widely circulated newspaper. It employs the Protest Event 
Analysis (PEA) methodology. 
The article is organized as follows: in the first section, I briefly introduce the recent 
debate on the crisis of democracy and the expansion of extreme right-wing movements and 
parties to identify broader transnational processes surrounding the Brazilian context. In the 
second section, I address the advancement of the anti-gender agenda and the extreme-right, 
focusing on the centrality of opposition to gender equity and LGBTQI+ rights in the rhetoric 
and action of conservative and far-right groups. In the third section, I briefly review the 
literature dealing with conservative and far-right social movements. In the fourth section, I 
present a description of the methodology for collecting and analysing empirical data, 
exploring its limitations as well as the possibilities it opens to understanding anti-gender 
politics in Brazil. In the fifth section, I analyse the empirical data, exploring the evolution of 
anti-gender protest events, the main individuals and social actors engaged in them, their 
level of participation, repertoires of action, objectives, and claims. Finally, I present some 
closing remarks, highlighting the role of the anti-gender agenda in the election of Bolsonaro 
in Brazil and reflecting on the extent to which the Brazilian experience helps us to 
understand broader social and political processes in the contemporary world. 
       
The crisis of democracy and the rise of the extreme right in the contemporaneity 
The crisis of democracy is one of the most widely discussed topics of contemporary 
social sciences. Scholars have been looking at its causes, meanings, and consequences, 
arriving at different, sometimes even contradictory, diagnoses. There is, however, a relative 
consensus regarding the centrality of the 2008 global crisis of capitalism in triggering the 
current political crisis (Castells, 2018). Decades of neoliberal policies resulted in the 
dismantling of social protection networks in several countries, placing vast population 
groups in a situation of extreme vulnerability to the cyclical crises of capitalist globalization 
(Przeworski, 2019). 
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In the post-2008 context, the very foundations of representative democracy have 
come under criticism (Brown, 2019; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Political parties, 
parliaments, elections, and other mechanisms of democratic representation have had their 
effectiveness put in check. The drastic reduction in political party membership, the 
decreasing participation of the population in elections, and a generalized distrust in the 
political class and institutions of representation (Foa and Mounk, 2017; Przeworski, 2019) 
have intensified, leading many analysts to envision a pessimistic scenario (Castells, 2018; 
Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018) in which liberal representative democracy would no longer be 
able to channell social conflicts and guarantee citizenship rights for most of the population. 
In response to the 2008 economic crisis, new social movements have emerged, 
criticizing the mechanisms of liberal political representation and demanding the deepening 
of democracy through the expansion of citizen participation. (Zizek, 2015; Pleyers, 2018; 
Pinheiro-Machado, 2019). It is in this context that extreme right movements rose in Europe 
and in the US (Skocpol and Williamson, 2016; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). While sharing 
many of the criticisms of representative democracy advocated by “progressive” movements, 
such as distrust in the political class and the ineffectiveness of representative institutions in 
responding to popular demands, extreme right movements have brought a strongly anti-
democratic political agenda to the public sphere. Immigrants and asylum seekers, Jews, 
Afro-descendants, feminists, LGBTQI+, environmentalists, and the “left” appear in the 
speeches of the right-wing groups as those responsible for the deterioration of the 
population’s living conditions. The exclusion of those groups from the democratic “demos” 
is regarded by right-wing groups as the only way to restore national order and prosperity 
(Wodak, 2015; Fassin, 2017; Traverso, 2019). 
Although the 2008 crisis of global capitalism helps us to understand the transnational 
dimension of the current crisis of democracy, it does not allow us to understand the 
particularities of different regional and national contexts. In Europe, for example, the 
European Union's inability to handle the 2015 migrant crisis had such a decisive symbolic 
impact that the rhetoric of far-right groups was echoed across various social groups 
(especially in the local working classes), who were dissatisfied with their loss of status and 
worsening quality of life (Traverso, 2019; Fassin, 2017). Several party organizations began 
to publicly defend racist, ethnocentric, misogynistic, and homophobic agendas, achieving 
expressive electoral results. In France and Germany, extreme right parties such as the then-
National Front (FN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD) parties obtained significant votes 
supporting a conservative, Eurosceptic, and anti-immigration agenda (Wodak, 2015; 
Traverso, 2019). 
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In the US, Barack Obama’s election, the first black president in the history of the 
country, and the greater visibility of the so-called “social minorities” contributed to the 
radicalisation of conservative sectors among the low-income and low-educated white 
population, particularly affected by the 2008 crisis (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). The “Tea 
Party” movement (Skocpol and Williamson, 2016) demonstrated  a strong capacity for 
mobilising conservative sectors around a White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant (WASP) ethno-
nationalism which opposed abortion, same-sex marriage, and immigration. The election of 
Donald Trump was strongly influenced by the mobilization of the extreme right, and 
intensified political polarization (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). 
The rise of conservative and right-wing groups has also been observed in Latin 
America and Brazil (Velasco Cruz et al, 2015; Solano, 2018; Pinheiro-Machado, 2019), but 
with some important distinctions. The first particularity refers to these groups’ lack of public 
presence during the 1980s and 1990s. Their proximity to former dictatorial governments 
resulted in their being highly criticized by society (Luna and Kaltwasser, 2014). In the 
Brazilian case, even conservative politicians rejected the terms "conservative" or "right-
wing", which some authors refer to as the “shamed right” (direita envergonhada) (Rodrigues, 
1987; Mainwaring et al., 2000; Quadros and Madeira, 2018). The second distinctive feature 
is the weakness (or even non-existence) of political parties that clearly identify with Latin 
America’s right-wing values and agendas. The weak organization of the right does not mean 
its political and institutional weakness. Luna and Kaltwasser (2014) and Eaton (2014) point 
out that the right has had relative success in securing positions of power in post-
democratisation political institutions, preventing the implementation of redistributive 
policies that would jeopardize elite interests. 
This context changed considerably at the beginning of the 21st century, with the 
election of left and centre-left governments across the region (Chase-Dunn et al., 2015; 
Weyland et al., 2010). They proposed the expansion of social spending, a greater presence 
of the State as an inducer of economic growth, and criticized the negative effects of the 
neoliberal, pro-market policies of the 1980s and 1990s. The “commodity boom” generated 
by China's growth (Weyland et al., 2010; Singer, 2012) made it possible for these 
governments to expand social spending and domestic consumer markets, resulting in some 
reduction of social inequalities. 
These measures did not prevent the negative consequences of the 2008 crisis arriving 
in Latin America. High inflation rates and the devaluation of local currencies affected not 
only the working classes, but also the urban middle classes (Singer, 2018), intensifying 
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criticisms against “progressive” governments and contributing to the reorganization of 
conservative groups. In Paraguay, Fernando Lugo's centre-left government was overthrown 
by a parliamentary coup orchestrated by conservative and right-wing sectors in 2012 
(Szwako, 2014). In Argentina and Chile, the centre-right managed to return to power 
through elections in 2015 and 2010, respectively. In Brazil, conservative and far-right sectors 
organised broad social mobilisations demanding the impeachment of President Dilma 
Rousseff between 2015 and 2016 (Velasco Cruz et al., 2015). These mobilisations had broad 
support from the media, as well as economic and political elites, resulting  in the dismissal 
of President Rousseff in 2016, in a controversial impeachment process denounced by various 
sectors of society as a “parliamentary coup” (Avrizter, 2019). 
 
Anti-gender politics and the rise of the extreme-right  
The crisis of democracy and the advance of the extreme right have unfolded in a 
context of increasing visibility of black Brazilians, women, LGBTQI+ and indigenous 
peoples, which demanded specific policies to address historical injustices. The visibility and 
the extension of rights to these groups have questioned, directly or indirectly, certain values 
and traditions rooted in society. Some social groups perceived the positive visibility of the 
so-called “minorities” as a threat to their existence as a community (Fukuyama, 2018). Far-
right political leaders have been cultivating the feeling of fear and threat (Wodak, 2015) in 
public opinion inciting the antagonism between us  (“the good citizen”, “the Christians”, 
“the Europeans”) and the “others” (“immigrants”, “Muslims”, “feminists”, “LGBTQI+” 
etc.). In such a scenario, there is no room for compromise and the “solution” of the political 
conflict necessarily passes through the (symbolic or physical) exclusion of this “other” from 
the political community (Traverso, 2019; Fassin, 2017). 
Depending on the national context, the social group chosen as the “scapegoat” can 
vary. However, feminist and LGBTQI + rights activists seems to be seen as the threating 
“other” in social and political contexts as heterogeneous as the US, Latin America, and 
Europe (Dietze and Roth, 2020). To understand the centrality of opposition to feminist and 
LGBTQI+ activism in the rhetoric of conservative and far-right actors, one must analyse the 
transformations experienced by the reproductive and sexual rights agenda over the last few 
decades. This agenda has progressed in several countries, as well as in international forums 
since the 1990s. The United Nations’ conferences of women in Beijing (1994) and the 
population of Cairo (1996) brought women’s rights to the centre of debates about human 
rights (Corrêa, Petchesky and Parker, 2008). An important novelty of both conferences was 
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the incorporation of the concept of gender in international initiatives to promote equality 
between men and women (Corrêa and Petchesky, 1996). The concept made it possible to 
incorporate the dimension of sexuality, expanding the scope of protection of human rights 
by including the right to abortion and the rights of the LGBTQI+ population (Corrêa, 2018). 
Simultaneously, laws expanding sexual and reproductive rights, such as anti-discrimination 
and pro-choice laws and the recognition of same-sex unions, were passed in several 
European countries (Temblay et al., 2011), as well as in Latin America (Corrêa and Parker, 
2011).  
The Catholic Church has played a leading role in the opposition to sexual and 
reproductive rights in the international sphere (Corrêa, 2018). In Brazil, as in other Latin 
American countries, the Catholic Church has shared this role with another important social 
actor: the evangelical churches, particularly the neo-Pentecostal denominations (Gomes da 
Costa, 2019). Despite the hegemony of religious actors in the opposition to sexual and 
reproductive rights, these issues have always been, to a greater or lesser extent, on the 
agendas of other conservative and right-wing groups (Kunhar and Paternotte, 2017; Prado 
and Corrêa, 2018). The defence of religious values and social hierarchies have always been 
central to the extreme right (Wodak, 2015; Traverso, 2019). The ethnonationalism defended 
by far-right movements and parties is often linked to religious values and metaphors, such 
as the assumption of an organic national community structured similarly to the “natural 
family” (Dietze and Roth, 2020). This notion of family is anchored in heteronormative 
assumptions, in which gender inequalities are perceived as part of the “natural order” and 
expressions of sexuality not conforming with heterosexuality are seen as “sinful” and 
“threats” to the existence of the nation (Mudde, 2020). 
In Brazil, the election of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, from the Worker’s Party, in 2003, 
was a milestone in the promotion of sexual and reproductive rights. Historical demands 
from the feminist and LGBTQI+ movements turned into a “government issue” (Gomes da 
Costa, 2016). In 2003, Lula da Silva’s administration created a secretariat to coordinate 
gender equality policies (Secretaria de Políticas das Mulheres). In 2004, it implemented the 
“Brazil without homophobia” (Brasil sem homofobia), the first nation-wide policy in Latin 
America specifically focused on the promotion of LGBT rights. In 2011, the Brazilian 
Supreme Court ruled in favour of recognising same-sex unions nationwide, followed in 2012 
by a ruling which widened the right to abortion in cases of fetuses with anencephaly.   
 Contrary to executive and judiciary initiatives, the agenda of sexual and 
reproductive rights was blocked by religious congressmen in the legislative, mostly 
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members of the evangelical caucus who were part of the governmental coalition (Gomes da 
Costa, 2019). The suspension of the distribution of the material “School without 
homophobia” in 2011, the approval of the bill legalizing conversion therapies (called the 
“gay cure”) in 2013 and the exclusion of the terms “gender equity” and “sexual orientation” 
of the National Education Plan in 2014 demonstrate the evangelical caucus' growing veto 
power. 
With respect to this last initiative, the support of the Catholic Church, coupled with 
the growing use in Brazil of the notion of “gender ideology” (Miskolci and Campana, 2017; 
Junqueira, 2018), were fundamental to garnering support from various sectors of society 
against sex education in schools. The notion of “gender ideology” has worked as an empty 
signifier (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Kuhar and Paternotte, 2017) capable of creating chains 
of equivalences among different, and even contradictory, political agendas. The notion of 
gender ideology made it possible for Catholic and Evangelical leaders to articulate with 
right-wing groups, such as the Free Brazil Movement (MBL). The group was one of the main 
leaders in the movement for the impeachment of President Rousseff in 2015-16 (Vrydagh, 
2020), defending a libertarian/pro-market ideology and engaging in the fight against “leftist 
indoctrination” in schools and universities. In this sense, to understand recent 
developments in anti-gender policies in Brazil, one must look at right-wing movements, 
their ideologies, repertoires of action and claims. 
 
Understanding the rise of the right: countermovements, blacklash politics, or new social 
movements? 
Over the last few decades, social movement academics have analyzed the specificities 
of conservative and right-wing movements (Klandermans and Meyer, 2005; Blee and 
Creasap, 2010; Rydgren, 2007; Castelli Gattinara and Pirro, 2019; Della Porta, 2020). One 
approach has identified such movements as “countermovements'', that is, mobilisations that 
emerge in opposition to certain social agendas. Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) proposes a 
theoretical-analytical framework to understand countermovements, defining them as “a 
movement that makes contrary claims simultaneously to those of the original movement” 
(Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996: 1631). The central feature of countermovements is their 
connection to an opposing movement, influencing each other with respect to the repertoires 
of collective action, framing, and the use of the political opportunities. The emergence of 
counter-movements depends on the relative “success” of the opposing social movement in 
achieving public visibility and obtaining political-institutional gains (legislation, public 
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policy, etc.) and the nature of the conflict in question. Claims that challenge deep-rooted 
values and traditions in society (such as abortion and LGBTQI+ rights) are more likely to 
generate countermovements. 
Although these authors correctly emphasize the impact of social movements on their 
opponents, the notion of countermovement is limited. It ignores that opposition to a certain 
agenda can promote the emergence of social movements on its own, engendering demands 
that are not necessarily linked to the agendas of an adversary movement. Additionally, the 
analysis of countermovements has focused mainly on conservative movements, pointing 
out another limitation of the concept, which should be applied, in theory, to either 
progressive or conservative movements. 
Thus, the present work follows the insights of academics who understand 
contemporary conservative and right-wing movements as social movements (Klandermans 
and Meyer, 2005; Blee and Creasap, 2010; Caiani et all, 2012; Vrydagh, 2020). There are, 
however, some challenges in this approach. The first refers to the defining features of 
"conservative" and "right-wing" movements, leading to a debate on the defining 
characteristics of the “left” and the “right”. Although I cannot go deeper into this broad 
political-philosophical debate, I emphasize that “left” and “right” are historical, relational, 
and contextual categories  whose defining features are constantly changing and depend on 
the specific context in which they are applied. Even so, I recognise, together with Bobbio 
(2001), that the commitment (or not) with the promotion of social equality is central to the 
definition of “left” and the “right”. For Bobbio, the “left” would include those who 
understand inequalities as being socially constructed (and thus that they can be mitigated), 
while the “right” would include those who see inequalities as natural (and thus immutable). 
Nonetheless, social movements associated with the “right”, far from constituting a 
homogeneous group, are “composed of different ideological tendencies, mobilizing around 
different issues, and using distinct action repertoires” (Caiani et all, 2012, p.3). Even 
recognizing the plurality of ideology and social actors and the difficulty in elaborating a 
definition capable of encompassing this diversity, Mudde (2000: 10-11) points out some 
common characteristics that would define the ideology of the extreme right: racism, 
xenophobia, nationalism, anti-pluralism, anti-communism, militarism. The extreme right 
also includes advocates for a strong populist political leadership and "Law and Order" 
policies. 
The second challenge refers to the difficulty in accessing right-wing movements. 
Since some operate underground due to links with terrorist groups, contacting right-wing 
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activists can be a very arduous task. In addition, several of these groups use threats and 
violence to pursue their causes, placing researchers in a situation of vulnerability 
(Klandermans and Meyer, 2005; Blee and Creasap, 2010). However, the internet has become 
a valuable source of data for analyzing the ideologies defended by groups of right and 
extreme right and to monitor their actions in public spaces. 
Most academics working with right-wing movements are affiliated with the Theory 
of Political Process. This text follows this trend, drawing inspiration from the insights of the 
Theory of Political Opportunities, as elaborated by Tarrow (2011). He defines the structure 
of political opportunities as "consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – 
dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics" 
(Tarrow, 2011, pp. 19-20). Among these dimensions, Tarrow highlights the presence of 
influential allies in the political system, the emergence of divisions between the members of 
the governing coalition and the decrease in the state's capacity to repress dissent. 
According to Tarrow, these dimensions could facilitate and/or hinder collective 
action. In a context of a favourable structure of political opportunities, the action of 
"challengers" can expand the opportunities for other groups to organize themselves, 
characterizing "cycles of protests". Another relevant component of collective action is 
framing. It allows social movements to identify injustices, to assign responsibilities and to 
propose solutions to social problems. Along with framing, social networks are important for 
social movements. In times of state repression, they can remain "hidden", later emerging in 
a more favourable context to collective action. The conjunction of these external and internal 
factors defines the "power" of social movements. 
 
Methodology 
In the present study, I used a methodology inspired by the insights of Protest Event 
Analysis (PEA). PEA has been applied and improved since the 1970s for the analysis of the 
cycle of protests and mobilisations of different social movements. It has been largely used 
by academics engaged in the so-called “contentious politics” to analyse both case studies 
and long-term social mobilisation processes (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow, 2001). PEA has 
been particularly promising in the systematic tracking of mobilisations and the 
characteristics associated with them (Beissinger, 2002). 
Hutter (2014) explores the different approaches, definitions, and methodologies of 
PEA. He points out that these methodologies were mainly focused on mobilisations driven 
by “progressive” social movements, emphasizing the “conflicting” dimension of the protest 
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event. This posed important challenges to our research. First, different social and political 
actors which, despite being engaged in anti-gender politics, did not necessarily identify 
themselves as part of the same social movement. Second, as with other conservatives and 
right-wing movements, many individuals engaged in anti-gender politics are professional 
politicians, who use the institutional/conventional channels of representative democracy to 
advance their political agenda. This dimension was overshadowed by an emphasis on the 
“contentious” dimension of collective action. 
Another important limitation of PEA concerns the selectivity of press coverage. As 
Lambelet (2009) points out, PEA would not consider mobilizations that have not been 
covered by the press. In addition, PEA would ignore movements and social actors for which 
visibility in the media is not part of their political strategy. Although I recognize these and 
other challenges, I agree with Beissinger (2002) when he affirms that the potential of PEA 
lies in its “adaptability to a wide variety of circumstances, depending on the researcher's 
purposes” (Beissinger 2002: 461) 
To accommodate the particularities of our research object, I opted, as Opp (Opp, 2009: 
38) for a broad definition of protest event as a “[…] action of individuals aimed at achieving 
their goal or goals by influencing decisions of a target.” To identify the actors, dynamics of 
actions and changes of anti-gender politics in Brazil in recent years, I elaborated a SPSS 
database of articles published in the Folha de S. Paulo (FSP), Brazil’s largest daily newspaper. 
To control potential biases from FSP’s coverage, I also collected articles published on O 
Globo, Brazilian second largest daily newspaper. However, I identified no major differences 
in the coverage of events related to anti-gender politics between these two publications. 
Therefore, following the insights of PEA, I decided to elaborate the database only with 
articles published on FSP to avoid possible repetitions.  
The collection process was based on certain keywords related to important issues of 
recent events related to anti-gender politics in Brazil across both newspapers between 2011 
and 2018. The reason for choosing these years lies in their relevance to  anti-gender politics 
in Brazil. 2011 was the year of one of the main setbacks to LGBTQI+ rights: the suspension 
in the distribution of the “School without homophobia” (Escola sem homofobia), material 
elaborated by the Ministry of Education, as part of the “Brazil without homophobia” plan 
to capacitate high-school teachers in public institutions in dealing with issues of gender and 
sexuality. Jair Bolsonaro was a central figure in the lobbying against the material, together 
with neopentecostal congressmen. This can be seen as the beginning of the involvement of 
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the extreme-right in the anti-gender politics in Brazil that would lead to Bolsonaro’s election 
to the presidency in 2018. 
The articles of Folha de S.Paulo are available through an online database1. Based on the 
chosen keywords2, the research resulted in 1,014 entries. Some entries were not directly 
related to any anti-gender politics event and were discarded.  Folha de S. Paulo editorials 
were also discarded since the data might have been biased. There remained 439 articles. 
Many of the collected articles were discarded since they did not refer to a particular protest 
event. On the other hand, some articles included up to four different events and were 
recorded as different cases in our database. The analysis processed 178 anti-gender protest 
events between 2011 and 2018. 
 
Analysing the anti-gender politics in Brazil (2011-2018) 
For each anti-gender protest event identified in FSP’s articles between 2011 and 2018, 
I recorded the article’s title, its date, and the date when the protest event happened. In some 
articles, there was no specific mention of the date of the protest event.  In these few cases, I 
considered the article’s publishing date as the date of the protest event. Regarding the 
timing of anti-gender protest events (henceforth AGPE), there is no clear pattern of 
evolution in time. However, it is possible to identify some peaks of mobilisation, observed 
in 2012, 2017, and 2018. 
Graphic 1: Evolution of the anti-gender protest events (2011-2018) 
 
Source: Folha de S. Paulo 
 
1 The database is available for Folha de S.Paulo subscribers at https://acervo.folha.com.br/index.do. 
2 The keywords chosen were: “gender”, “sexual orientation”, “education national plan”, “gender ideology”, “gay kit”, “gay 
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In those years, there were episodes that mobilised social and political sectors against 
the promotion of gender equality and sexual diversity: a) the local election in the city of São 
Paulo in 2012; b) the Queer Museum exhibition and its repercussions in the field of arts in 
2017; c) the public hearing on the decriminalization of abortion; and d) the election of Jair 
Bolsonaro, the last two episodes taking place in 2018. It is important to stress the relevance 
of the Queer Museum exhibition. It was opened in Porto Alegre in August 2017 and then 
closed on September 10th, 2017, after the wide mobilisation of conservative and religious 
sectors. The period between August and December 2017 concentrates 25.8% of all AGPEs. 
These five months encompassed the period of the exhibition and the reactions in 
favour/against its cancellation.  The high number of protest events in a relatively short 
period of time suggests the existence of a moral panic (Cohen, 2002; Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 
2009), in which there is a disproportionate increase in media coverage on a specific topic or 
social group, seen by public opinion as a threat to society (Gomes da Costa, forthcoming).  
In 2012 and 2018, elections were held (local and nationally, respectively) in which a 
common topic and person was at the centre of the political debate: the "School without 
homophobia" and Fernando Haddad, member of the Workers’ Party (PT). In 2012, Haddad 
ran for mayor of the city of São Paulo and was widely attacked by his opponents for 
supposedly having proposed the “gay kit” when he was Minister of Education. The topic 
returned in 2018, now capitalized by Jair Bolsonaro, who was the one responsible for coining 
the pejorative term “gay kit” in 2011. If we look at AGPEs taking place during election years 
(2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018), they encompassed 50.9% (N = 81) of cases, demonstrating the 
relevance of the electoral context for anti-gender politics in Brazil.  
Regarding the place of occurrence of the AGPEs, 36% (N = 64) occurred in Brasília, 
the federal capital. São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the first and the second largest cities appear 
in second and third place, with 27.5% (N = 49) and 12.9% (N = 22), respectively. The 
relevance of Brasília as the main locus of the AGPEs demonstrates the strongly institutional 
dimension of anti-gender politics in Brazil.  
In the vast majority (89.9%) of AGPEs reported between 2011 and 2018, it was not 
possible to identify the exact number of participants. As a way of circumventing the lack of 
information, "clues" contained in the analysed Folha de S. Paulo’s articles were used to 
estimate the number of participants3 . The values were assigned according to the following 
 
3 The strategy of estimating the number of participants in protest events was applied in the research “Dynamics of 
Collective Protest in the U.S., 1960-1995” conducted by Stanford University. The database and coding scripts for the 
analysis variables are available at https://web.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/ (Accessed on 29 April 
2021). 
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categories: 1 - Small, few (1-9 people); 2 - Group, committee (10 to 49 people); 3 - Large, 
gathering (50-99 people); 4 - Hundreds, mass, crowd (100-999 people); 5 - Thousands (1,000-
9,999 people); 6 - Tens of thousands (10,000 or more people). Based on the exact and 
estimated number of participants, AGPEs were classified into three categories: 1 -small (1 to 
99 participants); 2 - moderate to large (100-9,999 participants) and 3 - mass (10,000 or more 
participants). 
 
                              Table 1: Number of participants in AGPE 
  N % 
Small 29 72,5% 
Moderate to large 5 12,5% 
Mass 6 15,0% 
Total 40 100,0% 
                          Source: Folha de S. Paulo 
 
From the 40 AGPEs in which it was possible to obtain information (exact or 
estimated) on the number of participants, the majority (72.5%) were classified as small (from 
1 to 99 participants). AGPEs with moderate and mass participation accounted for only 12.5% 
and 15% respectively. Of the mass events, two events stand out: 1) the “March for Jesus”, 
organized annually by different evangelical denominations in São Paulo on the holiday of 
Corpus Christi and 2) the outdoor mass held by the Catholic Church during the visit of Pope 
Francis in 2013 in Rio de Janeiro. At the outdoor mass held at Copacabana beach, opposition 
to abortion (even in cases already legally allowed) played a prominent role, including the 
presence of the parents of an anencephalic child who handed the Pope an anti-abortion shirt. 
In 2012, the Brazilian Supreme Court had decriminalised termination of pregnancy in cases 
of anencephalic foetuses (Santos, 2012), under strong criticism from the Catholic Church 
and evangelical denominations. 
In the case of the “March for Jesus”, the anti-gender agenda was not isolated. The 
rejection of abortion and prostitution, criticism against the so-called “gay kit” and the 
spread of the “gender ideology” in schools were articulated with other issues relevant to 
conservative sectors, such as the fight against corruption (particularly the corruption 
scandals occurred during the Worker’s Party administrations) and the use of marijuana and 
other recreational drugs, as well as for the support for civilians holding firearms and the 
supposed “ideological neutrality” in schools. This suggests the emergence of a 
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conservative/right-wing frame in Brazil in which the economic and political crisis were 
intertwined with a moral crisis (Solano, 2020). This frame would be broadly applied by 
candidate Jair Bolsonaro in the 2018 election, particularly in the search for votes from the 
evangelical sector of the population. 
It was possible to identify 273 mentions of key individuals who participated in 
AGPEs. The mentions were categorised to measure the weight of each political and religious 
segment in AGPEs. Politicians were categorised in three groups: a) members of the 
evangelical caucus; b) members of the Catholic caucus and c) other politicians. Similarly, 
religious leaders (Catholic and Evangelical) active in civil society were counted separately 
from those holding office in institutions of political representation.  
                     
                 Table 2: Number of mentions of AGPE key individuals 
    N % 
Members of the evangelical caucus 93 34,1% 
Other politicians 49 17,9% 
“New-right” activists 38 13,9% 
Evangelical leaderships 34 12,5% 
Catholic leaderships 13 4,8% 
Members of the judiciary  13 4,8% 
Pro-life activists 13 4,8% 
Members of the Catholic caucus 8 2,9% 
Others 12 4,4% 
Total 273 100,0% 
                             Source: Folha de S. Paulo 
 
The evangelical caucus in Congress is the main actor, with 34.1% of all mentions. 
Together with other evangelical leaders, they make up almost half (46.6%) of all mentions. 
Politicians and leaders with religious ties represented the highest number of mentions 
(54.3%), confirming the relevance of Christian religions on anti-gender policies in Brazil. To 
identify possible changes in the prominence of different social groups between 2011 and 
2018, I crossed the mentions of key individuals with the year of AGPEs.  
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Graphic 2: Mentions of key individuals by AGPE’s year 
  
Source: Folha de S. Paulo 
 
The graph points to the pluralization of social actors involved in AGPEs. Until 2015, 
members of the evangelical caucus and other evangelical leaders dominated AGPEs. From 
2016 on, we can see the involvement of “new right” activists with 13.9% of mentions. The 
“new right activists” are those who emerged mainly amid the mobilisations demanding 
Dilma Rouseff's impeachment between 2014 and 2016 (Solano, 2018; Casimiro, 2018; Velasco 
Cruz et. Al, 2015; Vrydagh, 2020). The label “new right” does not necessarily refer to new 
ideologies and demands, but to the new ways of organising and occupying the public 
sphere, particularly through an innovative use of the internet (Cardoso, 2020). The Free 
Brazil Movement (MBL) features prominently among the “new right” groups. Founded in 
late 2014, the MBL was one of the main groups engaged in mobilisations that took hundreds 
of thousands to the streets to demand the removal of President Rousseff (Vrydagh, 2020). In 
2017, the group played a prominent role in the media by mobilising public opinion against 
the Queer Museum exhibition launched in Porto Alegre. The exhibition was accused of 
profaning Christian religious symbols and promoting paedophilia with the use of public 
funds4, resulting in its cancellation. The successful mobilisation against the Queer Museum 
exhibition led the MBL to “embrace” the moral agenda, assuming a prominent position in 
AGPEs in Brazil. 
 
4 The Queer Museum exhibition received public funds via the Rouanet Law (Law No. 8,313 / 1991). The law provides 
for the possibility of companies and private citizens to use part of the due income tax to fund cultural activities. The law 
has been the target of several criticisms from conservative sectors, which denounce the alleged use of public resources in 
cultural activities that would confront the Christian moral values of most of the Brazilian population. 
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I also identify organisations taking part in AGPEs. Only organisations explicitly 
mentioned as organizers and/or participants of an AGPEs were counted in this variable. 
Like the variable “Key individuals”, the unit of analysis here is the mention, since the same 
AGPE may have counted on the participation of more than one organization. 
 
               Table 3: Mentions of organisations participating in AGPE 
  N % 
“New right” organisations 27 31,8% 
Legislative branch (congress caucuses) 19 22,4% 
Catholic Church 12 14,1% 
Evangelical churches 10 11,8% 
Executive branch 7 8,2% 
Judicial branch 2 2,4% 
Political parties 1 1,2% 
 Others 7 8,2% 
Total 85 100,0% 
                    Source: Folha de S. Paulo 
 
The table above confirms the importance of organizations linked to the “new right” 
in AGPEs in Brazil. The MBL's involvement in the controversy surrounding the Queer 
Museum exhibition accounts for a good part of this percentage of mentions (31.8%). The 
closing of the exhibition in Porto Alegre in September 2017 triggered a sequence of other 
mobilisations against other artistic activities that addressed the issue of sexual and gender 
diversity. An example was the controversy surrounding the performance “La Bête” 
performed by choreographer Walter Schwartz at the Museum of Modern Art (MAM) in São 
Paulo. The performance was accused of promoting paedophilia after the disclosure of a 
photo on the internet in which a child, apparently accompanied by his/her mother, touches 
the choreographer’s naked body. The MBL promoted online and offline mobilisations, 
resulting in a complaint to the Public Prosecutor's Office against the artist and the museum 
(Gomes da Costa, forthcoming). 
After the “new right” groups, congress caucuses appeared as the second largest 
(22.4%) organisation taking part in AGPEs. The Catholic Church and the different 
evangelical denominations make up 14.1% and 11.8% respectively of the organisations 
engaged in AGPE. Together, the Christian churches accounted for 25.9% of the mentions to 
organisations promoting and/or participating in AGPE, corroborating once again the 
relevant role of Christian religions in the anti-gender politics in Brazil. 
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                                Table 4: Targets mentioned in AGPE 
 N % 
Executive branch 26 23,0% 
Cultural organisation/entity 25 22,1% 
Politicians 24 21,2% 
Professional associations  14 12,4% 
Professors/teachers/intellectuals/artists 9 8,0% 
Judicial branch  5 4,4% 
Others 10 8,8% 
Total 113 100,0% 
           Source: Folha de S. Paulo 
 
Another variable analysed was the target of AGPEs. Politicians and governmental 
and judicial institutions prefigured the main target of AGPE, with almost half (48.1%) of the 
mentions identified in analysed articles. The state, its institutions, and representatives are 
the prime targets for protest events for different social movements. This is due to the 
importance of state institutions as the main regulatory entity of social relations in 
contemporary societies (Tarrow, 2011; Melucci, 1996). The particularity of AGPEs lie, 
however, in the importance of the cultural sector as a privileged target. The cultural sector 
has only gained importance in AGPEs more recently, after 2015, as can be seen in the 
following graph. 
 
Graph 4: Targets mentioned by AGPE’s year 
  
Source: Folha de S. Paulo 
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Considering only the targets between 2016 and 2018 (N = 68), almost half of them 
(47.1%) were cultural entities (museums and cultural centres) as well as artists, intellectuals, 
and teachers. The greater relevance of the cultural and intellectual sector as a target for anti-
gender protest events is possibly linked to the growing role of the “new right” groups, 
especially the MBL. The group was prone to import the model of “culture wars” that have 
been widely used by US-based conservative and alt-right groups (Hartman, 2019). Together 
with other “new right” groups, the MBL has stressed the existence of a supposed hegemony 
of the left in the cultural field. Criticisms of the so-called “cultural Marxism” proliferate 
among these groups (Solano, 2018; Lacerda, 2019; Goldstein, 2019) and the issues of gender 
and sexual diversity are seen by conservative sectors as the main “weapons” of the left in a 
supposed “war” being waged against Christian values. These arguments are present in 
several anti-gender mobilisations in Europe (Kuhar and Paternotte, 2017; Dietze and Roth, 
2020) and Latin America (Prado and Corrêa, 2018). 
This work also sought to identify the claims made by individuals and groups 
engaged in anti-gender politics. In most of the AGPEs, one or more claims were identified, 
making it necessary to use the mention of each claim as a unit of analysis. The five most 
recurrent claims of AGPEs were: 1) opposition to the “gay kit” (12.6%); 2) opposition to the 
teaching of “gender ideology” in schools (11.9%); 3) support for ideological neutrality in 
schools (9.9%); 4) opposition to abortion (9.5%), and 5) opposition to the Resolution 01/1999  
which prohibited the treatment of homosexuality as a disease (also known as the “gay cure”) 
(5.9%). These claims show the importance of education as an area of dispute in anti-gender 
politics, similarly to what Schmincke (2020) identifies as “the holy trinity” of sexual politics 
from the right: gender, sexual diversity, and sex education. This becomes more explicit 
when we aggregate similar claims into one category. The opposition to the “gender 
ideology” and the teaching of gender and sexual orientation represent almost a third (31.2%) 
of all the identified claims. 
                                    Table 5: Claims mentioned on AGPE 
  N % 
Gender ideology/sexual orientation in 
education/schools 79 31,2% 
”New right”/ “Cultural Marxism” 38 15,0% 
Abortion 30 11,9% 
Censorship in arts and literature 24 9,5% 
Children sexuality 16 6,3% 
Gay cure (Resolution CFP 01/1999) 15 5,9% 
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Trans rights 5 2,0% 
Same-sex unions  4 1,6% 
Others 42 16,6% 
Total 253 100,0% 
                            Source: Folha de S. Paulo 
 
Recent studies (Penna, 2018; Mattos, 2018; Vencatto et al., 2018) stress education as 
the new arena of dispute for social groups opposing gender equity and sexual diversity in 
Brazil. Several anti-gender groups mobilised between 2014 and 2016, successfully lobbying 
for the exclusion of all mentions to gender and sexual orientation in the education plans 
national and locally.    
Another example of disputes around education is the self-identified movement 
“Schools without Party”, created in 2004 by the lawyer Miguel Nagib. In its initial proposal, 
the movement preached schools’ “ideological neutrality”, in response to a supposed 
“leftist” hegemony in the Brazilian field of education. The proposal provided for the right 
of parents and guardians to question the content delivered in the classroom. It also included 
the punishment of teachers accused of violating students' beliefs and freedom of 
conscience5. The movement gained visibility when, in 2015, a law inspired by the 
movement's recommendations was approved in the state of Alagoas. At the federal level, 
congressman Izalci Lucas presented a bill incorporating the “Schools without Party” 
movement's proposal almost in its entirety. The first version of the project made no mention 
of “gender ideology”. The term was later included in 2018 by congressman Flavinho, as a 
result of the strategy of the “Schools without Party” movement to garner support from 
religious sectors. From then and on, the “Schools without Party” bill became one of the main 
banners of religious and extreme right groups, gaining intense visibility in the press. 
Finally, this article sought to point out the repertoire of action applied by 
individuals/organisations engaged in the anti-gender protest events. As in the variables "key 
individuals", "organisation", "target" and "claims", the paper identified at least one 
repertoire of action in several of the AGPEs. Altogether, I identified 41 different repertoires 
of action. They range from more conventional actions (such as lobbying, presentation of 
bills, participation in public hearings, etc.), through to more disruptive actions (holding 
 
5 Recently, the Spanish extreme-right party Vox tried to push forward a similar legislation, called by the media “PIN 
parental”, allowing parents to veto complementary activities allegedly “controversial” issues to their children during 
classroom time (El País, 2020). A same movement is happening in the US. Republican-led legislatures have passed bills 
banning or limiting the teaching of Critical Race Theory in schools (Gabriel and Goldenstein, 2021).  
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demonstrations and protests, promoting boycotts) and even more violent actions, such as 
threats. The five most frequent repertoires of action were: 1) interviews (10.5%); 2) 
campaigns/protests on social media (7.6%); 3) the presentation of bills (7.1%); 3) lobbying 
(6.7%); 4) demonstration and protests (5.7%), and 5) the approval of legislation (5.2%). 
Excluding demonstrations and protests, the four most performed repertoires of action are 
conventional, within the institutional channels of representation. This reinforces the 
hypothesis that anti-gender politics in Brazil are institutional in nature.  
  If we aggregate similar repertories into broader categories, the institutional 
dimension becomes even more explicit. The first category, which accounts for more than a 
quarter of the repertoires of actions (28.6%), is related to political-parliamentary life (lobby, 
presentation, debate and approval of legislation, commissions and public hearings, 
parliamentary speeches, etc.). The second category of repertoires of action most identified 
in AGPEs (16.2%) was the holding of virtual demonstrations and protests. Several authors 
(Pleyers, 2018; Castells, 2018; Alcântara, 2016; Vrydagh, 2020) stress the relevance of the 
internet as a space for interaction and articulation of activism networks, information 
exchange, and political mobilisation.  
  
                      Table 6: Repertoires of action performed in AGPE 
 N % 
Lobbying/ activities in representative 
institutions 60 28,6% 
Virtual protest/ mobilisation (online) 34 16,2% 
Interviews/Participations in radio/TV 
programs 29 13,8% 
Protest/mobilisation in the public sphere 
(offline) 22 10,5% 
Electoral and partisan activities 11 5,2% 
Lawsuits  10 4,8% 
Threats 8 3,8% 
Others 36 17,1% 
Total 210 100,0% 
                     Source: Folha de S. Paulo 
 
If we compare the repertoires of action with the year of protest events, we can identify 
certain changes. The first change is the pluralization of the repertoires of action, especially 
in years in which we observe “peaks of mobilisation”. When it comes to parliamentary, 
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electoral, and partisan activities, they varied over the years, but they always occupied a 
prominent position in anti-gender politics in Brazil. 
 
Graph 5: AGPE repertoires of action by year 
 
                   Source: Folha de S. Paulo 
 
The use of the internet in AGPEs dates back to 2012. However, its peak occurred in 
2017, when we witnessed the mobilisations against the Queer Museum exhibition. The MBL 
was forged in the virtual environment around 2014 and it has made extensive use of virtual 
tools to mobilize its followers since (Vrydagh, 2020). 
Two other “innovations” in relation to repertoires of action are the use of “lawsuits” 
and “threats” as tools of political action. These became more present in AGPEs after 2015 
amid two processes that strongly impacted recent Brazilian politics: the growing 
politicization of the Judiciary and the resurgence of the “new right” groups in the public 
space. Both processes have been fed back, mainly after the start of the anti-corruption 
“Operation Car Wash” in 2014 (Avritzer, 2019; Cardoso, 2020). The media's biased coverage 
of the operation disproportionately emphasized the role of the leaderships of the then-
ruling-Workers’ Party in the corruption scandals, spreading an Anti-Workers’ Party 
sentiment (anti-petismo) amongst the general public opinion, which portrayed the party (and 
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the Left more broadly) as intrinsically corrupt and responsible for all the existing evils in 
Brazilian politics (Solano, 2019). 
Anti-petismo was reinforced by the existence of promiscuous relationships between 
prosecutors and judges involved in Operation Car Wash6. They infringed the principles of 
impartiality, independence, and equidistance between defence and prosecution. Anti-
petismo has also resurfaced a latent anti-communist sentiment that permeated the discourses 
of right-wing groups (mainly among the military) in Brazil in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s 
(Cowan, 2016). Recent formulations such as the so-called “cultural Marxism” has updated 
the anti-communist sentiment (Cardoso, 2020; Lacerda, 2019; Motta, 2019). The “Bolivarian 
threat” represented by the governments of Hugo Chávez and Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela 
has been extensively used by the renewed anti-communist rhetoric (Lacerda, 2019; Motta, 
2019). The growing prominence of the anti-communist extreme right and the strength of 




This article aimed to analyse anti-gender politics in Brazil and its possible impacts on 
the recent authoritarian turn represented by the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018. Inspired 
by the literature on social movements, the article identified individual and collective actors 
engaged in anti-gender politics, the targets of their mobilisations, their claims, and 
repertoires of action. The data has shown that religious leaders, particularly neo-
Pentecostals, are still the main protagonists of anti-gender politics in Brazil. Between 2011 
and 2018, neo-Pentecostal leaderships and denominations stood out as the most engaged in 
AGPEs. However, the data suggests that since 2016, the “new right” has increasingly taken 
part in AGPEs. Groups such as the Free Brazil Movement  (MBL) stood out in organising 
AGPEs, articulating their pro-market and anti-communist/“leftist” agendas with the 
opposition to sexual and reproductive rights, echoing a recent elective affinity between 
neoliberalism and new conservatism (Brown, 2019; Cooper, 2017). The engagement of the 
“new right” in AGPEs leads to significant changes not only in the targets of the mobilisations 
and repertoires of action, but also in their claims. 
 
6 The website The Intercept Brasil (Greenwald et. al, 2019) disclosed messages exchanged through the application 
Telegram between judge Sérgio Moro, responsible for the Operation “Car Wash”, and the public prosecutors and the 
Federal Police. In them, Moro gave instructions to the prosecutors on how lead the accusation against Lula da Silva, even 
suggesting the extensive use of media to build a case against the former president in the public opinion.    
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Until 2015, the main target of anti-gender mobilisations were state actors (with 
emphasis on the executive and judiciary branches) and professional politicians, 
demonstrating a relevant feature of anti-gender politics in Brazil: their political-institutional 
character. This is demonstrated by the centrality of Brasília as the locus of AGPEs, the small 
number of participants, the relevance of the electoral years for the mobilizations and the 
wide use of lobbying as a repertoire of action. From 2016, with the increasing engagement 
of the “new right” in AGPEs, the targets of mobilizations became more plural. Cultural 
organizations, artists, intellectuals, and teachers, as well as education in general became 
targets of AGPEs. In this sense, the “new right” contributed to importing “cultural wars” 
into Brazil, widely used by conservative and far-right groups in the US (Hartman, 2019). 
Although the mobilisations continue to gather a relatively low number of participants, they 
became more disruptive, with the use of new repertoires of action, particularly the intensive 
use of the internet as a tool for online and offline mobilisation and an increasing number of 
threats as a strategy for political action. 
The growing participation of the “new right” in AGPEs contributed to the inclusion 
of opposition to sexual and reproductive rights into a conservative/right-wing framework. 
This framework has characterized Brazil’s economic and political instability, the visibility 
of the political class’ corruption scandals by the media, and the demands of LGBTQI+ and 
feminists’ activists as symptoms of a major moral crisis (Solano, 2020). The notion of gender 
ideology has been operating as an “empty signifier” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Kuhar and 
Paternotte, 2017) capable of articulating anti-gender agendas, such as the rejection of 
abortion, same-sex unions, prostitution, sexual education, and queer cultural expressions 
with conservative/right-wing claims such as the fight against corruption, the legalisation of 
recreational drugs, the ideological/leftist indoctrination of schools and universities, as well 
as the promotion of “Law and Order” policies. “Gender ideology” allowed the “new right” 
to articulate the moral agenda with the anti-petismo disseminated in the collective imaginary, 
mobilising not only conservative and right-wing groups and individuals, but also important 
segments of the centrist constituency.  
Bolsonaro was central in the process of articulating conservative and right-wing 
groups around the anti-gender agenda. Since his criticism against the so-called “gay kit” in 
2011, the former congressman has gained prominence in the press with his radical right-
wing position, becoming a sort of spokesman for anti-petismo. Until mid-2013, the former 
captain was constantly mocked by the media as a bizarre ultraconservative backbencher. 
However, after the 2013 Journeys of June, a context of favourable political opportunities 
(Tarrow, 2001) arose for conservative and right-wing groups, many of whom were excluded 
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from the broad coalition of support for the Workers’ Party administration. The party’s 
historic commitment to social movements and democracy created a context of freedom for 
conservative and right-wing groups to organize and occupy the public sphere without 
resistance or repression. Dilma Rousseff's tight re-election in 2014 and the refusal of her 
opponent, Aécio Neves, to accept the results, operated as an incentive for more radicalised 
groups to take the lead in opposition against the Workers’ Party. It was in this context that 
the impeachment movement emerged, taking hundreds of thousands to the streets. The 
MBL was one of its main organisers (Vrydagh, 2020). 
The movement's success in deposing President Rousseff gave right-wing groups 
important political strength. Amid the impeachment mobilisations, Bolsonaro intensified 
contacts with conservative groups, especially with members of the evangelical caucus. Even 
though he identified himself as Catholic, the congressman was baptized in 2016 in the 
waters of the Jordan River in Israel by pastor Everaldo, a prominent neo-Pentecostal leader 
who ran for president in 2014 (Almeida, 2017). The baptism symbolically sealed the alliance 
between neo-Pentecostal leaders and Bolsonaro. From then on, Bolsonaro travelled through 
the country to gather new allies, always being welcomed by fervent supporters. Even in 
early 2018, many of Bolsonaro’s supporters still did not believe in the viability of his 
candidacy. However, the confirmation of the arrest of former President Lula da Silva by the 
Supreme Court and the poor performance of the centre and right-wing candidacies turned 
Bolsonaro into a strong competitor. The broad mobilisations against his candidacy led by 
the #NotHim movement and the controversial knife attack suffered during the campaign 
consolidated Bolsonaro as leader of a broad conservative front, which was articulated by 
pro-market centre-right groups as well as the radical right, who defended military 
intervention. 
Bolsonaro's rise to power in 2019 resulted in the empowerment of these right-wing 
extremist groups and triggered a process of deterioration of democratic institutions, an 
unprecedented political process in Brazil’s recent history. The increasing presence of 
members of the armed forces in different areas of public administration has turned 
Bolsonaro’s administration into a “de facto” military government. The advance against 
institutions of social and institutional control (national congress, councils, universities, 
media, judiciary) has intensified. The “anti-gender approach” has become a government 
policy through the increasing presence of politicians from the religious caucuses (with an 
emphasis on the evangelical caucus). The anti-gender agenda, coupled with the pro-
agrobusiness, pro-market, and pro-gun agendas, have converted the Brazilian State into a 
threat to the existence and safety of vulnerable social groups, such as indigenous people, 
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black people, women and LGBTQI+ people, in addition to jeopardizing the environment. In 
this sense, the Brazilian case seems to be an example of the economic, political and social 
consequences of the rise of the extreme-right to power and the threat it can pose both locally 
and globally.  
The COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent deterioration of the country’s economy 
and public health were not able to stop the actions of the more radicalised sectors of 
Bolsonaro's administration. Furthermore, the anti-gender rhetoric remains fundamental for 
Bolsonaro to mobilise his most loyal constituencies. At the height of the first wave of the 
pandemic, in July 2020, Bolsonaro declared that the use of the mask as a strategy to fight the 
spread of the virus was a “faggot thing” (Moreira, 2020). The pandemic led to the removal 
of several centre-right groups from the government. The MBL, which supported Bolsonaro 
in 2018, has criticised Bolsonaro's denialism of the sanitary crisis. Despite the current crisis, 
the president is managing to maintain the support of around a quarter of the Brazilian 
electorate, particularly among neo-Pentecostal constituencies. This suggests that the anti-
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